Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1987

Thomas D. Mills and Gayle J. Mills v. Charles
Moore : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
E. Craig McAllister; McAllister & Chuntz; Attorneys for Respondents.
Evan A. Schmutz; Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough; Attorneys for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Mills v. Moore, No. 870460 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/658

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

*m&

UTAH COURT OF API
TAH
OC'JMENT
FU
)

B

",EF
/—

E UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

N

THOMAS EOIILLS^ and
GAYLE J. MILLS,

10
3CKET NO

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
DEAN S. BIRD and
JULIE A. BIRD

CHARLES VMOOREp WEST STAR
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation; DEAN S.
BIRD and JULIE A. BIRD,
Defendants-Respondents.
DEAN S. BIRD and JULIE A.
BIRD,
Cross-claimants,

Case No. 870460-CA

CHARLES MOORE and WEST STAR
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation,
Cross-defendants.
/

ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT,
HONORABLE E. PATRICK McGUIRE, PRESIDING.
E. Craig McAllister
MCALLISTER &. CHUNTZ
One East Center Street, Suite 303
P.O. Box 1372
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorneys for Respondents
Dean S. Bird and Julie A. Bird
Evan A. Schmutz
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
McDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellants Mills

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THOMAS D. MILLS and
GAYLE J. MILLS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
DEAN S. BIRD and
JULIE A. BIRD

v.
CHARLES MOORE; WEST STAR
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation; DEAN S.
BIRD and JULIE A. BIRD,
Defendants-Respondents.
/

DEAN S. BIRD and JULIE A.
BIRD,
Cross-claimants,

Case No. 870460-CA

v.
CHARLES MOORE and WEST STAR
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation,
Cross-defendants.
/

ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT,
HONORABLE E. PATRICK McGUIRE, PRESIDING.
E. Craig McAllister
MCALLISTER & CHUNTZ
One East Center Street, Suite 303
P.O. Box 1372
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorneys for Respondents
Dean S. Bird and Julie A. Bird
Evan A. Schmutz
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellants Mills

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

,

1

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

A. Nature of the Case

1

B. Court of Proceedings and Disposition
of the Case Below

2

C. Statement of Facts

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT
I.

Mills only remedy under this contract with Birds
is forfeiture of the Contract due to their deliberate
striking out of other additional remedies
II. The Court?s award of attorneys fees under Section
78-27-56 of the Utah Code is justified
. . . .
III. Birds are entitled to damages for the frivolous appeal

6
.
.

IV. Birds has reasonably relied upon the clear terms of the
contract and would suffer injustice if Mills is
permitted to repudiate these terms.
V.

Mills knowledgeably elected to pursue a particular
remedy, evincing a purpose to forego all others,
and under the election of remedies doctrine they
are precluded from seeking to pursue a different
and inconsistent remedy at a later time.

9
.

io

11

12

CONCLUSION

14

ADDENDUM

15

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES:
Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1983)

13

Biesinger v. Behunin, 584 P.2d 801 (Utah 1978)

9

Cady v. Johnson, (Utah 1983) 671 P.2d 149

xl

Hall Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982)

g

Jones v. Acme Building Products, Inc., 450 P.2d 743 (Utah 1969)

g

Jorgensen v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 373 P.2d 580 (Utah 1962)

8

Lehigh, Inc. v. Stevens, 468 P.2d 177 (Kansas 1970)

13

Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Utah 1976)
OfBrien v. Rush, (Utah App. 1987) 744 P.2d 306

n
10

Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Financial Corp., 603 P.2d 793 (Utah 1979) 13
United American Life v. Zions First National Bank, 641 P.2d 158 (Utah 1982) 12
Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 500 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1972)

6 7

STATUTES:
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56

9

Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 33(a)

10

ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction over this appeal is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals
by the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(c) and Rule 3 of the Rules of
the Utah Court of Appeals.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and
the Judgment entered by the Eighth Circuit Court for the State of Utah, Utah
County, Provo Department, Judge E. Patrick McGuire presiding. Judgment was
granted upon BirdsT Motion for Summary Judgment.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the lower court correctly hold that Mills1 remedies of Birds'

breach of contract is limited to enforcement of a forfeiture of the property?
2.

Did the lower court correctly award attorneys T fees to Birds

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

MillsT statement of the nature of this case is accurate except in the
following respect:
Mills claimed in their objection to BirdsT findings of fact and in their
appellate brief that certain facts were stipulated to in presenting the cross1

motions for summary judgment. Such was not the case and was pointed out by
Birds in their response to Mills1 objection to their proposed findings of fact.
The Court ruled on the cross-motions for summary judgment based on the
affidavits of Birds and their counsel that were unopposed by Mills. The factual
allegations of those affidavits were set forth verbatim in the findings of fact.
The only one added was the CourtTs own finding that Mills1 action was brought
in bad faith and that Birds were entitled to attorneys fees.
The courtTs conclusions of law determined that the Uniform Real Estate
Contract eliminated all remedies for default except forfeiture and the Mills1
action for damages should be dismissed. In addition, the court concluded that
the Birds were entitled to a judgment for attorneys' fees against Mills based
upon the findings of fact.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Case Below.

Mills1 statement of the course of proceedings and disposition of the case
below is accurate except where it indicates that the facts set forth in the
affidavit of Dean S. Bird and Julie A. Bird were stipulated to for any indication
that all facts set forth in all affidavits (including that of Birds1 attorney) were
not stipulated to. In fact, there was no stipulation of facts but the Court found
facts based on the unopposed affidavits of Birds and their counsel. Mills* also
indicate that the Court denied both motions for summary judgment when it
ordered the matter set forth trial. Such is not established by the record.

C.

Statement of Facts.

The statement of facts is most simply presented by review of the findings
2

of fact of the Court v/hich was a verbatim quotation of the two unopposed
affidavits of Birds and their counsel except for the finding of the Court that
Mills claim was brought in bad faith and Birds were entitled to attorneys fees.
The statement of facts presented in Mills' brief follows the findings of fact to a
certain extent but adds some others favorable to Mills which the Court did not
find nor were presented by Mills and left out several findings of fact v/hich
supported the CourtTs judgment against Mills. A true statement of facts follows
as was found by the Court upon the unopposed affidavits:
1.

On or about October 1, 1981, Mills entered into a Uniform Real

Estate Contract (the Contract) with Birds.
2. At the time the Contract was signed by the parties paragraph 16 had
been stricken and the notation made in the margin with reference to Escrow
Instructions.
3.

Mills designated Zion National Title, Inc., to prepare the above

documents.
4.

The only conversation or communication that Birds had with Mills

prior to signing the above documents was a meeting with Mr. Mills several weeks
prior to signing contracts and it was not concerning the documents themselves
but the general terms of the transaction, not including the remedies of the
Seller in the event of default.
5. The Contract and Escrow Instructions were signed by Mills outside
Birds' presence and there was no communication or discussion between Mills and
Birds at that time.
6.

After Mills signed the documents, they were delivered to Birds at
3

their home by Mike Hallock of Zion National Title, Inc., for signing at which
time they signed them. At the time Mike Hallock of Zion National Title, Inc.,
brought the documents to Birds' home to sign them, there was no conversation,
discussion or other communication between Birds and Mr. Hallock regarding the
striking of paragraph 16 from the Contract and substituting therefore the
additional terms and conditions of the Escrow Instructions.
7. On or about April 10, 1985, Birds sold their interest in the subject
property to West Star Development Corporation, (West Star) a Utah corporation.
8.

That transaction was accomplished by the execution by Birds of a

Warranty Deed which was delivered to West Star.
9. Prior to answering the Complaint for Birds, Birds' attorney spoke with
Mills' attorney on the phone and informed him that the addendum to the real
estate contract included as an exhibit with the Amended Complaint was not the
one signed by Birds nor included in the contract, that the one signed by Birds
was materially different in that it did not provide for any remedy other than
forfeiture and requested that Mills dismiss their Complaint against Birds as a
result thereof and not require that Birds incur any further attorney's fees in
defending the matter. Mills' attorney later communicated to Birds' attorney his
knowledge of and familiarity with the correct addendum to the contract signed
by Birds and in fact sent it to Birds' attorney to replace the incorrect one
included with the Amended Complaint served on Birds.
10.

In both the telephone conversation and communications with the

replacement exhibit, Mills' attorney required that Birds respond to the Complaint
which Birds retained counsel to do and agreed to pay a reasonable fee therefor.
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The deliberate deletion of the default remedies enumerated in the

Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into by the parties and the Addendum of
the Contract giving an exclusive remedy of forfeiture limits the legal action for
default to the forfeiture remedy.
II.

Additional remedies are unavailable.

AttorneysT fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 should be

awarded to the Birds under the circumstances of this case because this action
was prosecuted in bad faith and without merit. The existing facts and case law
clearly did not support the Mill's action.
HI. Because this appeal is not only without merit but also without any
basis in law or fact, Birds are entitled to single or double costs including
reasonable attorneys fees for this appeal.
IV. Birds relied to their detriment on the express terms of the contract
as prepared by Mills or their agents in reselling the property on terms not
including an indemnification from the buyer of their obligation to the Mills nor
any collateral security interest in the property.

Therefore, the Mills are

equitably estopped from pursuing any remedy other than that of forfeiture
provided in the Contract.
V. The Mills elected a remedy by excluding others in the Contract and
are bound to that election.

5

ARGUMENT
I.

MILLS ONLY REMEDY UNDER THEIR CONTRACT WITH BIRDS IS

FORFEITURE OF THE CONTRACT DUE TO THEIR DELIBERATE STRIKING OUT
OF OTHER ADDITIONAL REMEDIES.
Mills focus their entire argument against the Court f s decision on some
claimed necessity that the forfeiture provision, which was the only remedy
provided for in the Contract, must in and of itself state that it is the exclusive
remedy and that the provision in paragraph 21 for payment of attorneys fees in
the event other remedies are pursued in fact create those other remedies. Such
may have been the case had there been some patent ambiguity in the Contract
where the intent of the parties was not clear.
However, an established and primary rule of contract law is that ". . . if
the language of the contract is such that the intention of the parties is clearly
and unequivocally expressed, if must be enforced according to its terms."
Wingets, Incorporated v. Bitters, 500 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Utah 1972); citing, Jones v.
Acme Building Products, Inc., 450 P.2d 743 (Utah 1969).
Mills or their agents deliberately crossed out remedies enumerated in the
Contract which were available to them in case Birds defaulted on the Contract,
and substituted the exclusive remedy of forfeiture.

Mills argue in their brief

that this was a result of "a title officer's apparent belief that he was deleting
only forfeiture provisions, etc.".

Such was never presented as evidence by

affidavit of Mills or any other and is improper to argue the whole change of the
Contract to be the mistake of some title officer. Mills also argue that, because
there was no actual discussion by the parties of the Contract, there is no
6

decision to delete all default provisions. If that were the general rule, there
was no decision for Mills to have any remedies because it was never discussed.
The actions of the parties in signing the Contract as changed indicates they had
a clear and unequivocable intent to limit their remedies to those specifically
included in the contract and to exclude those that were crossed out.

Both

parties agreed to these terms and because they are conclusive, the Court must
give effect to the Contract as it is written, in the absence of fraud. Mills did
not object to the uncontested facts as set out by Birds and it is clear that the
intent of both parties was that Mills' remedies would be limited to what was
specifically set out in the Contract, that of forfeiture.
Mills cite two cases in support of their proposition that they are not
limited by the remedies expressly set out in the Contract unless they are
specifically stated to be the exclusive remedy. The holdings of these cases are
not directly applicable to the present case and are not binding upon this Court.
The two cases merely held that where one remedy is listed in the Contract,
other remedies are not automatically precluded unless the one is stated to be the
exclusive remedy. Neither case involved facts dealing with contracts such as the
one present here, whereby Mills deliberately crossed out specific remedies and
substituted others in their place, later attempting to reinvoke the invalidated
remedies.

They are clearly distinguishable from this case as there was an

immense difference between a court refusing to limit remedies in the absence of
language to the contrary and allowing deliberately crossed out remedies to be
held actionable by Mills.
In Wingets, Incorporated v. Bitters, 500 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1972), the
7

Supreme Court of Utah reviewed an action brought by seller of property against
buyers for balance due on the contract price which seller had declared
"immediately due and payable" on grounds the buyers were in default. The Court
held that provisions of contracts should be construed most strictly against the
party whose attorney drew the contract; especially when dealing with forfeitures.
Id. at 1010. Mills did not dispute that the contract in question was prepared by
their agent. Thus any questions of its construction should be construed strictly
against them.
Another pertinent observation made is that, where there is a choice, an
interpretation which will bring about an equitable result will be preferred over a
harsh or inequitable one. Id. at 1010; citing Jorgensen v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
373 P.2d 580 (Utah 1962).

It is clear that to grant Mills a remedy that was

intentionally excluded from the contract would reach an inequitable result as
more further presented in the argument number II following.
Other jurisdictions, specifically Arizona, have supported the proposition
that:
[W]here parties bind themselves by a lawful contract, in the
absence of fraud a court must give effect to the contract as it is
written, and the terms or provisions of the contract where clear
and unambiguous, are conclusive. . . . The intent of the parties
must control the interpretation of a contract. It is not within the
power of the court to alter, revise, modify, extend, rewrite, or
remake an agreement. Its duty is confined to the construction or
interpretation of the one which the parties have made for
themselves.
In Hall Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982)
the Supreme Court reaffirmed that long-standing rule in Utah that "persons
dealing at armrs length are entitled to contract on their own terms without the
8

intervention of the courts to relieve either party .from the effects of a bad
bargain." Id. at 749; See, e.g., Biesinger v. Behunin, 584 P.2d 801 (Utah 1978).
Additionally, courts will not rewrite a contract to supply terms which the parties
omitted.

Id. at 749.

When applied to the case at hand, these rules indicate that terms which
the plaintiff failed to include in the Contract can not be included at this late
point in time. If Mills wished to leave open the way for remedies in addition to
forfeiture, they should have stipulated it in the Contract. Here, Mills are even
going beyond this point as they are not only asking the Court to allow remedies
not mentioned in the Contract to be sought, but to actually revalidate provisions
that Mills deliberately and intentionally invalidated by striking them out. For a
court to allow such an injustice would definitely be an inequitable burden for
the Birds to be forced to bear.
In conclusion, the intentional striking of a remedy in the Contract
excluded it from pursuit by Mills and neither the reference to them without
actually providing for them in Paragraph 21, nor the absence of plain language
in the forfeiture provision making it exclusive, can revive them.
II. THE COURTS AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES UNDER SECTION 78-27-56 OF
THE UTAH CODE IS JUSTIFIED.
Mills argue that there were no facts presented to the Court by which it
could find Mills1 case to be without merit and brought in bad faith. Such is not
the case.
In support of Birds' motion for summary judgment was filed not only
Birds' affidavit but the affidavit of Birds' attorney (R.42, 44, 54, and 62). Such
9

affidavit was not contradicted in any way by Mills and therefore could be
accepted by the Court as true facts. In summary, that affidavit set forth that
Mills attached to the original complaint a contract with the wrong addendum for
forfeiture attached.

Mills1 counsel was informed of such and told by Birds'

counsel that the true addendum did not provide for any remedy other than
forfeiture and requested that Mills dismiss the complaint against Birds because of
that.

In spite of the clear knowledge of Mills and their counsel of the true

addendum later submitted by them, which clearly showed forfeiture as the only
remedy in the contract, they continue to pursue their case which the trial court
has found was without merit. To bring a case totally lacking in merit when the
only evidence is clear documentary evidence unambiguously excluding the action
of Mills can be assumed as nothing but bad faith upon which the Court could
award attorneys fees.

There is nothing in the record to support appellant's

claim that the delay in the Court's ruling on the motions for summary judgment
was because of any difficulty of the legal issue. In fact, Mills' misstate the
Court's response to the cross-motions in claiming that they were both denied
when the case was set for trial. Such was not the case nor indicated in the
record of the case.
m.

BIRDS ARE ENTITLED TO DAMAGES FOR THIS FRIVOLOUS APPEAL.
Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals provides:
If the Court determines that a motion made or an appeal taken
under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award
such damages and single or double costs, including reasonable
attorneys fees, to the prevailing party.
The case of O'Brien v. Rush, (Utah App. 1987) 744 P.2d 306, 66 Utah

Adv. Rep. 18, treated in detail Rule 33(a) and the requirements for costs and
10

attorneys fees to be awarded pursuant to it.

Citing Cady v. Johnson, (Utah

1983) 671 P.2d 149, the Court concluded that a frivolous appeal is one without
merit.

Additional guidance was given by Rule 40(a) of the Rules of the Utah

Court of Appeals which states:
The signature of an attorney or a party constitutes a certificate
that the attorney or the party has read the motion, brief, or
other papers; that to the best of the attorneys or the parties
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable
inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law; and that it is not interposed for any
improper purposes, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay
or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
The Court found such definition sufficiently objective that it could be
applied without delving into the subjective intent of the parties and that there
was no necessity of finding "bad faith,T to award attorneys fees. In conclusion,
it held that with regard to claims that are not only without merit but are also
without basis in law or fact, the respondent is entitled to the benefit of Rule
33(a).
This Honorable Court can see from the arguments of Mills' brief that
they are based solely on two cases which are no where near consistent with the
facts of this case and no other supporting precedent. The arguments are totally
frivolous as the agreement between the parties was extremely clear and no
question of the propriety of the trial courts decision. Therefore, Birds should be
awarded single or double costs including reasonable attorneys fees for this
appeal.
IV. DEFENDANT HAS REASONABLY RELIED UPON THE CLEAR TERMS OF THE
CONTRACT AND WOULD SUFFER INJUSTICE IF PLAINTIFF IS PERMITTED TO
11

REPUDIATE THESE TERMS.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel operates to prevent a party who has,
without fault, been deluded into a course of action by the wrong or neglect of
another.
Estoppel arises when a party by his acts, representations . . .
intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to
believe certain facts to exist and that such other acting with
reasonable prudence and diligence, relies and acts thereon so that
he will suffer an injustice if the former is permitted to deny the
existence of such facts.
Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976); See also, United
American Life v. Zions First National Bank, 641 P.2d 158 (Utah 1982).
Birds in this case reasonably relied upon the clear and express terms of
the Contract, which specifically set out the exclusive remedy of forfeiture in
case Birds defaulted. As a result of their reasonable reliance on such express
terms, Birds sold the property to co-defendants, West Star without any collateral
or security or requirement of indemnification by such buyer of Birds1 obligations
to Mills.

Such was set forth in their affidavits in support of the motion for

summary judgment.

Such establishes a detrimental reliance on the clear and

express terms of the agreement which should estop Mills from pursuing any
remedy but that of forfeiture provided in the contract.
V. MILLS KNOWLEDGEABLY ELECTED TO PURSUE A PARTICULAR REMEDY,
EVINCING A PURPOSE TO FOREGO ALL OTHERS, AND UNDER THE ELECTION
OF REMEDIES DOCTRINE THEY ARE PRECLUDED FROM SEEKING TO PURSUE
A DIFFERENT AND INCONSISTENT REMEDY AT A LATER TIME.
Mills do not contest the facA that Paragraph 16, which listed specific
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remedies in case of default, was stricken in the Real Estate Contract, ft is also
uncontested that beside Paragraph 16 there is specific reference to the Escrow
Instructions, where there is one remedy listed, that of forfeiture.

When Mills

elected the specific remedy of forfeiture by striking out Paragraph 16 and
inserting the Escrow Instructions instead, they made a choice to pursue a
specific cause of action in case of default, and must forego seeking other
remedies at a later time.
In Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1983),
the Supreme Court of Utah held that:
The doctrine of election of remedies is a technical rule of
procedure and its purpose is not to prevent double redress for a
single wrong.
Said doctrine presupposes a choice between
inconsistent remedies, a knowledgeable selection of one thereof,
free of fraud or imposition, and a resort to the chosen remedy
evincing a purpose to forego all others.
Td. at 778; Citing, Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Financial Corp., 603 P.2d
793, 796 (Utah 1979).
Other jurisdictions further support this rule. The Court in Lehigh, Inc.
v. Stevens, 468 P.2d 177 (Kansas 1970) discussed the doctrine of election of
remedies and interpreted it to preclude a party who has elected to pursue a
particular remedy, having full knowledge of the facts, from later pursuing a
different and inconsistent remedy. Id. at 181.
The application of the doctrine of election of remedies to the present
case prevents Mills from pursuing an action to obtain a money judgment for the
amounts due on the contract and should be limited to the exclusive remedy of
forfeiture.

Mills lost their right to seek remedies outside of forfeiture when

deliberately striking them from the Contract, and alternatively inserting the
13

exclusive remedy of forfeiture.

Birds relied upon the clear language of the

Contract and would be injured if Mills were now allowed to repudiate the terms
as originally agreed upon.

CONCLUSION
It is clear from the face of the Uniform Real Estate Contract between
Mills and Birds that all remedies of the Seller provided for in the Contract were
stricken. It is also clear that from the face of the Contract that the exclusive
remedies available to the Seller were contained in the Addendum to the Contract.
The only remedy provision mentioned within the Addendum is the forfeiture
remedy.

There is no provision for any other remedies such as the specific

performance sought by the Mills, suing for delinquent installments, or treatment
of the Contract as a mortgage and foreclosing. Such being the clear meaning of
the written agreement between Mills and Birds, the decision of the lower court
should be affirmed.
The court should also uphold the decision of the lower court in the
awarding of attorney fees to the Birds. The action by the plaintiff was in bad
faith and without merit. Also, the court should award attorney fees for services
rendered in defending this frivolous appeal.

ADDENDUM
Birds will append to this brief copies of the following documents:
1. Affidavit of Birds supporting their motion for summary judgment.
2.

Affidavit of Birds' attorney supporting the motion for summary
14

judgment.
3, Minute Entry of the Court setting the case for trial without ruling on
the motions for summary judgment.
DATED this 12th day of May, 1988.

0£ Attorneys for Respondents
z^Dean S. Bird and Julie A. Bird
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
was mailed, postage prepaid, this '? r^day of May, 1988, to the following:
West Star Development
c/o Margaret Moore
Registered Agent
270 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Charles Moore
143 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Evan A. Schmutz
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah o ^ i u i
re brf
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E . Craig McAllister, No. 2138
E . CRAIG MCALLISTER & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Defendants
Dean S. Bird and Julie A. Bird
One East Center Street, Suite 303
Post Office Box 1372
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: 375-8891
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT
THOMAS D. MILLS and
GAYLE J. MILLS,

AFFIDAVIT OF DEAN S. BIRD
AND JULIE A. BIRD

Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. 86 CV 698

CHARLES MOORE: WEST STAR
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation; DEAN S.
BIRD and JULIE A. BIRD,
Defendants.
/

STATE OF UTAH
County of Utah

)
ss.
)

We, Dean S. Bird and Julie A. Bird, upon oath duly sworn, state:
1.

We are defendants herein and have personal knowledge of the

facts stated herein.
2.

On or about October 1, 1981 plaintiffs entered into a Uniform

Real Estate Contract (the Contract) with us attached hereto as Exhibit
A and made a part hereof by this reference.
3.

At the time the Contract was signed by the parties paragraph

16 had been stricken as it appears in the copy and the notation made

1

in the margin with reference to the Escrow Instructions attached
hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated herein by this reference.
4.

Plaintiffs designated Zion National Title, Inc. to prepare

the above documents.
5.

The only conversation or communication that we had with

plaintiffs prior to signing the above documents was a meeting with Mr.
Mills several weeks prior to signing contracts and it was not concerning
the documents themselves but the general terms of the transaction, not
including the remedies of the Seller in the event of default.
6.

The Contract and Escrow Instructions were signed by plain-

tiffs outside our presence and there was no communication or
discussion between plaintiffs and us at that time.
7.

After plaintiffs signed the documents, they were delivered to

us at our home by Mike Hallock of Zion National Title, Inc. for
signing at which time we signed them.

At the time Mike Hallock of

Zion National Title, Inc. brought the documents to our home to sign
them, there was no conversation, discussion or other communication
between us and Mr. Hallock regarding the striking of paragraph 16 from
the Contract and substituting therefore the additional terms and conditions of the Escrow Instructions.
8.

On or about April 10, 1985 we sold our interest in the sub-

ject property to West Star Development Corporation, (West Star) a Utah
corporation.
9.

That transaction was accomplished by the execution by us

2

of

a Warranty Deed which was delivered to West Star attached hereto as
Exhibit C and incorporated herein by this reference.
10.

Because the Contract signed between plaintiffs and us elimi-

nated all remedies for default except forfeiture, the only recourse
which we secured against West Star in our transaction was a Promissory
Note for the amount of our equity in the property.

We secured no

recourse against West Star for default under our contract with plaintiffs nor any collateral to secure West Star's performance of our
contract with plaintiff.
DATED

/'i/'s'i

/

/

^

JJMX,
Dean S. Bird

//,/„

\
•''*
Julie A. Bird
Subscribed and sworn to before me on

Residing at: (^ ; — <^ (/?' .
Commission expires: \/J •>!,*'

I

3

<?<<., J

fit,;' 7. /•#(.

NOTARY PUBLIC
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true $nd correct copy of the foregoing was
mailed, postage prepaid this j T ^ i a y of May, 1986, to the following:
Evan S.Schmutz
Robert A. Goodman
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

m/1 bi4

and which may 'become due orT thrst premises dunnf tht lift of this tfrttmeni. Tht Sfltcr hereby covenants tndagretf

E. Craig McAllister, No. 2138
E . CRAIG MCALLISTER & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Defendants
Dean S. Bird and Julie A. Bird
One East Center Street, State 303
Post Office Box 1372
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: 375-8891
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT
THOMAS D. MILLS and
GAYLE J . MILLS,

AFFIDAVIT OF
E . CRAIG MCALLISTER

Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. 86 CV 698

CHARLES MOORE: WEST STAR
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation; DEAN S.
BIRD and JULIE A. BIRD,
Defendants.
I
STATE OF UTAH
County of Utah

)
ss.
)

I, E. Craig McAllister upon oath duly sworn, state:
1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of

Utah and have a personal knowledge of the facts stated herein.
2.

Prior to answering the Complaint for defendants, I spoke with

plaintiffs' attorney on the phone and informed him that the Addendum
to the Uniform Real Estate Contract included as an exhibit with the
Amended Complaint served on defendants was not the one signed by
defendants nor included in the Contract, that the one signed by defen-

1

dants was materially different in that it did not provide for any
remedy other than forfeiture and requested that plaintiffs dismiss
their Complaint against defendants as a result thereof.

Plaintiffs 1

attorney later communicated to me his knowledge of and familiarity
with the correct Addendum to the Contract signed by defendants and in
fact sent that to me to replace the incorrect one included with the
Amended Complaint served on defendants.
3.

In both his telephone conference with me and his com-

munication to me with the replacement exhibit, plaintiffs" attorney
required that defendants respond to the Complaint which defendants
retained counsel to do and agreed to pay a reasonable fee therefore.
4.

In defending defendants Dean and Julie Bird in this matter I

have taken the following actions:
4/16/86
4/17/86
4/18/86
4/30/86
5/01/86

5/06/86

Review of file and legal research
abt action
Phone conf with clients and plaintiffs 1 attorney abt the case
Conf w/ clients abt the case
Diet of ltr to plaintiffs 1 atty
re: answer
Phone conf with plaintiffs 1 atty
and clients; diet of answer,
motion for sum. judgment, memo,
of points and auth. k affidavits
Review and r e v . of memo, of
points and authorities and
affidavits and conf with clients

2

.6 h r s .
.6 h r s .
1.0 h r s .
.2 h r s .

1.4 h r s .
.4 h r s .

5.

A reasonable attorney f s fee therefore is $378.00.

DATED this 7th day of May, 1986.

~ E . Craig McAllister
Of Attorneys for Dean S. Bird
and Julie A. Bird
/
/

Subscribed and sworn to before me on

*77/^c: 7
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Residing a t : : ^ " , - : Commission expires: < / - / - ?Z
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NOTARY PUBLIC
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
mailed, postage prepaid this J day of May, 1986, to the following:
Evan S.Schmutz
Robert A. Goodman
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT
THOMAS D. MILLS and
GAYLE J. MILLS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CHARLES MOORE: WEST STAR
DEVELOPMENT CORP., DEAN S. BIRD
and JULIE A. BIRD,
Defendant.

NOTICE OF SETTING
Case No.

86 CV 698

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the above entitled case is set for
TRIAL on the 15th day of JUNE, 1987 at 9:00 o'clock A.M.
in the Courtroom of the Eighth Circuit Court, Provo Department,
359 West Center, Provo, Utah.
By order of the Court, Trial is set for the above time and date.
Kimberly Relf
Deputy Clerk
I certify that true copies of the foregoing Notice of Setting
were mailed, postage prepaid, on this 29th day of April, 1987, to
the following interested parties:
Evan Schmutz-170 South Main Street, SLC, UT 84101
West Star Development-270 E. 900 S., SLC, UT 84111
Charles Moore-143 E. 900 S., SLC, UT 84111
E. Craig McAllister-One E. Center, #303, Provo, UT 84601
Kimberly Relf
Deputy Clerk

